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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK

Regulation of shadow banking

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Framing of key issues around shadow banking



Traditional banking is the funding of illiquid assets through money-like instruments which benefit from explicit credit and liquidity support from the official sector

- Money is a unit of exchange, unit of account, and store of value
- Money has no intrinsic value; it is as valuable as the holders of money believe
- There is a close empirical connection between public confidence in money and economic activity
- Fragility of public confidence in the value of money underlies the motivation for official sector credit and liquidity support for bank deposits




Shadow banking is the funding of illiquid assets through money-like instruments that do not benefit from explicit credit and liquidity support from the official sector

- Rationale for credit intermediation outside traditional intermediaries includes specialization, financial innovation, and regulatory arbitrage
- Rationale for maturity transformation outside banks, and the creation of private money-like instruments, is largely the pursuit of low-cost and risk-insensitive sources of funding
- Fragility of confidence in value of private money, combined with connection between money and economic activity, underlies official sector concern about shadow banking

Banking crises are followed by large declines in economic activity



Past Unemployment Cycles and Banking Crises: Trough-to-peak Percent Increase in the Unemployment Rate (left panel) and Years Duration of Downturn (right panel)



Retail depositor run at Northern Rock, 9/2007

Reinhart and Rogoff (2009): "The Aftermath of Financial Crises," NBER working paper 14656

Even healthy bank failures have permanent real economic effects





Figure 4a: Healthy First RepublicBank Failures




Ashcraft (2005): "Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-induced Failure of Healthy Banks," American Economic Review, Volume 5, Issue No 5 (December).

Historical perspective on importance of shadow banking

Credit and Maturity Transformation

Total liabilities as percent of nominal GDP




Traditional Credit Transformation Bank and BHC term debt Pension liabilities Insurance liabilities


Traditional Maturity Transformation Bank deposits Interbank loans


Shadow Credit Transformation Mutual Funds Corporate Bonds GSE debt


Shadow Maturity Transformation Money market shares Security Repos Open Market Paper

Financial crisis experience of shadow banking










Note: Shaded area September 16 - October 21



Regulating traditional and shadow banking activities

(Investor) market discipline


Prudential market regulation



(3) Boundary between traditional and shadow banking

Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)

Recent uses of the regulatory toolbox



- 2. Interactions between traditional and shadow banking
 -) ABCP
 -) Tri-party Repc
 - iii) Derivatives
 - *iv)* Leveraged Lending

- 4. Prudential market regulation
 -) NRSROs
- ii) MMMFs
- ii) Risk Retention
- iv) Reg Al
- /) Secured Financing Haircuts